When he delivers his first Budget tomorrow, John Healey will announce that he is to allocate £7 million to explore how the Olympics could be brought to the North of England. As somebody who grew up in Huddersfield I can see the appeal of the neighbouring cities hosting such a prestigious event. However, the economic case for doing so is very weak.
The main issue is the fact that the costs associated with hosting the Games are astronomical and always higher than anticipated. Researchers at Oxford’s Saïd Business School examined every Games since 1960 and found cost overruns in every single one of them, averaging 156 per cent in real terms, the highest of any type of megaproject it compared.
Moreover, its 2024 update was even more blunt. It found that the Olympics are the only project type that has never come in on budget. Paris 2024 ran about 115 per cent over, at roughly $8.7bn. What is more, it found that attempts at cost containment fail. For example, the IOC’s big reform, reusing existing venues rather than building new ones, failed to bring costs down in both Tokyo and Paris. These figures count only sports-related spending, so the true bill, with transport and regeneration taken into consideration, is even larger.
Britain is not an exception to this. For example, London’s bid priced the Games at £2.4bn. However, by 2007 the public funding package stood at £9.3bn. Defenders point out, fairly, that the National Audit Office later judged that the Games were likely to come in about £377mn under that package. However, hitting a target after it has been reset to nearly four times the original can hardly be described as a triumph of financial discipline. Venue security alone needed an extra £500 million, and MPs warned that the full public cost of the Games and their legacy – including items outside the package – was heading for about £11bn.
Why do cities keep overpaying? Because the seller is a monopolist with many suitors. Bidders compete to promise the most, and the winner is bound by a host contract that leaves the financial risk largely with the host. The winning bid is, by construction, the most optimistic one. The exception proves the rule. After the overruns of the 1970s scared off rivals, Los Angeles was the only bidder for 1984, negotiated favourable terms and made a profit. The IOC offers good terms only when nobody else wants the job.
So far we have seen that the costs are huge, but if we want to assess if something represents good value for money then we must also look at the benefits as well. Unfortunately, these are few and far between.
For example, in a review of the evidence for the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Robert Baade and Victor Matheson concluded that hosting usually loses money for the city, with positive net benefits only in unusual circumstances. Tourism is the standard promise, but the Games displace ordinary visitors. Overseas visits to Britain fell 5 per cent in August 2012 compared with a year earlier, although spending rose.
The strongest evidence for the benefits probably comes from Matthias Firgo of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research. He compared host regions with the regions that lost the bidding contest and found that Summer Olympic Games raised regional GDP per capita by around 3 to 4 percentage points relative to the host country in the year of the event and the year before.
However, the longer-run effect was not statistically robust. What is more, even at face value, that is a modest result. GDP counts the construction spending the Games require, so a bump in output while billions of pounds of public money are being spent is not the same as a return on that money. Earlier studies, Firgo notes, found no measurable effect on host countries as a whole.
This brings us onto the next point: infrastructure. One of the main drags on productivity growth in the UK – and in the North in particular – is a lack of infrastructure, especially in transport. Surely hosting the Games is a good use of taxpayers’ money if it leads to more of it being built? The answer is no.
This is because there is a danger that while transport infrastructure is built, it will primarily serve journeys and routes which make attending the Games more convenient for spectators rather than what would best serve the long term interests of firms and households in the region.
Furthermore, it increases the costs and decreases the availability of material and skilled labour. This risks crowding out other, more productive infrastructure and housing projects as they become too expensive to build or because the skilled labourers are already committed to working on the less economically useful projects.
We also have to look at what needs to be built. While it’s true that the North is already home to some world class stadiums and facilities, it will still need to build more of them. This will include an incredibly large stadium with an athletics track. The government will argue that this is fine as they will count as ‘assets’. While in some instances this might be true, in most cases it won’t be. Many of these venues will be quite niche or, as in the case with what would be the new Olympic Stadium, inappropriate for most uses. As such, the government or local authority would struggle to find buyers for them. What is more, they will continue to depreciate in value and will need to be maintained at the taxpayers’ expense or left to fall into disrepair and ruin. Almost every city that has hosted the Games has found themselves with at least one white elephant.
So, this leaves us with arguably the most honest argument for hosting the Games: the feelgood factor. While it may be an honest argument, it’s still a pretty flimsy one. For example, research by Paul Dolan and his colleagues at the LSE drawing on 26,000 residents of London, Paris, and Berlin, found that hosting raised life satisfaction in the host city during the Games, especially around the opening and closing ceremonies. It found little evidence of a lasting effect. The authors calculated that Londoners’ willingness to pay did not cover the cost, and that a modest gain elsewhere in the country would be needed to make hosting worthwhile.
The economic case for the North hosting the Olympics is weak. Unfortunately, the government is still likely to press ahead with it for two main reasons.
First, last month Healey announced that he had instructed officials at HM Treasury to reduce the Green Book’s discount rate. This essentially means that projects which may have previously been considered bad value for money are now much more likely to pass a cost:benefit assessment than before and receive funding.
Second, even though it’s really bad economics, it’s pretty good politics and for politicians, politics beats economics every time. It’s a very easy win for Burnham and Healey to promise to bring the Games to the North as it fits in with their narrative and can be used to win over voters – provided they’re kept in the dark about the true costs.
The North of England hosting the Olympics might sound like a great idea and would no doubt create a huge amount of excitement in my hometown and it’s also very clever politically. Unfortunately, the economic case just doesn’t stand up. The Chancellor needs to be honest with the public and stop the bid from going any further.
Notes & Sources
- Yorkshire Post, Northern Olympics project to get £7 million study in Budget (October 2026): the Chancellor will announce a £7 million feasibility study for a Northern Games in the Budget on Wednesday 28 October; UK Sport's earlier assessment looked at a bid for the 2040s.
- Flyvbjerg, Stewart and Budzier, The Oxford Olympics Study 2016 (Saïd Business School, July 2016): sports-related costs of the Games, 1960–2016. Cost overrun data exist for 19 of the 30 Games; all 19 overran, by 156 per cent on average in real terms, the highest of any type of megaproject studied. Wider infrastructure costs are excluded.
- Budzier and Flyvbjerg, The Oxford Olympics Study 2024 (June 2024, revised July 2024): Paris 2024 estimated at $8.7 billion (2022 prices), 115 per cent over budget in real terms; the Games are the only project type that has never delivered on budget; reusing existing venues did not have the intended effect for Tokyo 2020 and looked ineffective for Paris 2024.
- Play the Game, Auditors: London 2012 delivered value for money (6 December 2012): London's original cost estimate of £2.4 billion and the £9.3 billion public funding package set in 2007.
- National Audit Office, The London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games: post-Games review (5 December 2012): a likely £377 million underspend against the £9.3 billion package, and £500 million of additional venue security costs for which there was originally no provision.
- Pinsent Masons Out-Law, Olympic infrastructure not to blame for projected £2bn overspend, MPs say (12 March 2012): the Public Accounts Committee's chair said the full public cost of the Games and their legacy was heading for around £11 billion against the £9.3 billion package.
- Baade and Matheson, Going for the Gold: The Economics of the Olympics (Journal of Economic Perspectives 30(2), Spring 2016): in most cases the Olympics lose money for host cities, with positive net benefits only in very specific and unusual circumstances; Los Angeles 1984.
- TravelMole, The Olympics Wrap from VisitBritain (3 October 2013): overseas visits to Britain were 5 per cent lower in August 2012, while spending rose 9 per cent.
- Firgo, The causal economic effects of Olympic Games on host regions (Regional Science and Urban Economics 88, 2021): using losing bidders as the comparison, Summer Games raised regional GDP per capita by about 3 to 4 percentage points relative to the national level in the year of the event and the year before; longer-run effects were not statistically robust.
- Dolan, Krekel and co-authors, Quantifying the intangible impact of the Olympics using subjective well-being data (Journal of Public Economics, 2019): a panel of 26,000 residents of London, Paris and Berlin; well-being rose in London during the Games, especially around the opening and closing ceremonies, with little evidence of a lasting effect; Londoners' willingness to pay alone did not cover the cost.
- CapX, Is John Healey crowding out private infrastructure? (7 September 2026): the Chancellor's cut to the Green Book discount rate, the social time preference rate, from 3.5 per cent to 3 per cent.